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This article considers the challenges faced by
digital evidence specialists when collaborating
with other specialists and agencies in other
jurisdictions when investigating cyber crime. The
opportunities, operational environment and
modus operandi of a cyber criminal are
considered, with a view to developing the skills
and procedural support that investigators might
usefully consider in order to respond more
effectively to the investigation of cyber crimes
across State boundaries. 
Carrying out blackmail by using a computer, for
example, is a particularly popular category of computer
crime which involves the coordination of law
enforcement and investigatory groups on an
international level. A representative case was that
involving three Russian individuals who extorted up to 4
million US dollars from United Kingdom based on-line
casinos and bookmakers.1 The criminals were taken into
custody in September 2004 following the successful
joint efforts of the National High Tech Crime Unit in the
UK, Interpol, the FBI, Russia’s Interior Ministry and the
Prosecutor General’s office. The authors propose in this
article that the Electronic Discovery Reference Model
(EDRM), which is a useful framework for systemic
thinking, can used to support the need for collaboration
during the investigation process.
Introduction
Historically, an investigation was in principle a self
contained, self-controlled, self-centered, solitary
activity. Typically, communications of findings were
limited to internal (local) members from the same team,
each member familiar with the terminology and
vocabulary. Lack of scientific procedures in criminal
investigations in the early years dictated such an
approach.2 However, advances in science such as
fingerprinting, blood analysis and trace evidence
resulted in increasing numbers of specialists becoming
involved in crime scene investigations, in turn increasing
the complexity and size of the communication channels.
The advances in, pervasiveness and ubiquitous nature
of, information technologies3 and in turn the global
nature of cybercrimes, have increased the need for
investigators to engage in complex inter-group
communication on a multinational basis as they
investigate criminal acts using interconnected
technologies.
Furthermore, the different judicial systems throughout
the world create a challenging environment for the
investigators of cybercrimes. Whilst criminals use
information technologies as they see fit across national
boundaries, it is no longer possible for investigators to
operate individually. It is now necessary to collaborate
across State boundaries, which makes the cybercrime
scene a greater challenge for any investigator and a
more pertinent area for research than before.4
The main aim of this article is to highlight some of the
issues involved in investigating cybercrimes across
State boundaries and the need to collaborate on the
particular problem of determining the scope of inquiry,
and what can or cannot be investigated in connection
with the crime scene. Within this context, it is relevant
to explore the following issues:
1 John Layden, ‘Russian bookmaker hackers jailed
for eight years’, The Register, 4 October 2006,
available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/
10/04/russian_bookmaker_hackers_jailed/.
2 Claire Valier, ‘True Crime Stories: Scientific
Methods of Criminal Investigation, Criminology
and Historiography’, British Journal of Criminology,
Volume 38, Number 1, (1998), pp 88-105.
3 Sarandis Mitropoulos, Dimitrios Patsos and
Christos Douligeris, ‘Incident Response
Requirements for Distributed Security Information
Management Systems’, Information Management
& Computer Security, (2007), Volume 15, Issue 3,
pp 226-240.
4 Roderic Broadhurst, ‘Developments in the Global
Law Enforcement of Cyber-Crime’, Policing: An
International Journal of Police Strategies &
Management, (2006), Volume 29, Issue 3, pp 408-
433.
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a.How to incorporate important elements in the
investigatory practice to deal with the complexity of
investigations across jurisdictions.
b.How to decide where relevant data or evidence in
relation to an investigation is located and how it is
recovered.
c. Establishing who is or ought to be involved in
determining the scope of the investigation.
d.How investigators collaborate with each other and
other relevant agencies to provide for a common
understanding of the problems, and the use of a
language that is clear to all parties.
e.The logistics and complexity of negotiating the
collection of digital data when investigating a
cybercrime.
The main concern is not on the management of data or
information, but on how digital data is judged to be of
relevance, and how this is communicated to other
jurisdictions when investigating a cybercrime.
Identifying the need for collaborative
enquiry and communication 
As with many traditional crime scene investigations, a
cybercrime investigation may need to investigate
hardware, software or storage (whether physical
devices or virtual areas) that contain private data.
Whether an investigator has the authority to investigate
private data will depend on the nature of the crime and
the substantive and procedural laws of the jurisdiction
in which the investigation takes place.
It has been recognized that existing procedures and
practices in forensic investigations are in need of further
development when investigating on-line fraud and
cybercrime in general.5 The take-up of digital technology
has changed the landscape of the crime scene,
increasing the need for cross-jurisdiction investigation
and collaboration, and the use of sound forensic
practices and procedures. It may be that the procedures
and techniques used in a digital crime investigation are
so flawed that that will be excluded from legal
proceedings.
There has been considerable discussion regarding the
definition of the crime scene and, more recently, the
cybercrime scene - see for example the distinction
between ‘live versus dead systems’6 from which the
problem of defining the actual cyber crime scene
boundaries becomes evident. The blurring of distinctive
boundaries containing the cybercrime scene occurs due
to the ubiquitous nature of digital media, the
investigator’s experience and skills needed to
manipulate the data, together with the context and type
of the respective crime. Changes in society, technology
and behaviour have influenced the environment and
opportunity for crime and therefore the extent of the
crime scene. Furthermore, these changes also serve to
extend the skills that the investigation of cybercrime
requires. Despite the significant progress in teamwork
between different agencies, existing research does not
address the complexity of the problem.7 A central
challenge in the support for and coordination of forensic
investigators is to enable them to work together, as a
team, for a common purpose.
Cybercrime scene investigation
Cyber crimes are not new, as illustrated in Karyda and
Mitrou:8
‘cyber-crimes are not necessarily new crimes; many
cases involve rather classic types of crimes where
criminals exploit computing power and accessibility to
information. However, it seems that the anonymity
provided through the Internet encourages crimes that
involve the use of computer systems, since criminals
believe that there is a small chance of being
prosecuted, let alone being caught for their actions.’
This is further supported by researchers from a variety
of disciplines, as well as lawyers. Professor Noel Cox
suggests that cybercrime is by nature a cross border
crime,9 and Professor Marjie T. Britz comments that ‘for
the first time, criminals can cross international
boundaries without the use of passports or official
5 Judie Mulholland, Message from the Guest Editor,
Special Issue: Phishing and Online Fraud Part II,
Journal of Digital Forensic Practice, Volume 1, Issue
3, 2006, pp 151-2.
6 Eoghan Casey, editor, Handbook of Computer
Crime Investigation, (Academic Press, 2002), p 2.
7 David V. Pynadath and Milind Tambe, ‘The
Communicative Multiagent Team Decision
Problem: Analyzing Teamwork Theories and
Models’, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research,
Volume 16, (2002), pp 389-423.
8 Maria Karyda and Lilian Mitrou, ‘Internet
Forensics: Legal and Technical Issues’, in
Proceedings of Second International Annual
Workshop on Digital Forensics and Incident
Analysis, Bart Preneel, Stefanos Gritzalis, Spyros
Kokolakis, and Theodore Tryfonas (ed), IEEE
Computer Society, 2007, p 4.
9 Noel Cox, ‘Cyber-crime Jurisdiction in New
Zealand’, in Bert-Jaap Koops, Susan Brenner and
Paul de Hert (eds), Cybercrime Jurisdiction: A
Global Survey, (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006), pp 177-
188.
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documentation’.10 Cyber crime has long been recognized
as being transnational by nature, and attempts have
been made to provide for an international framework.11 It
follows that there is a need for operational co-ordination
and collaboration across state boundaries by
investigating authorities.
While an experienced forensic investigator would
recognize best practices in dealing with a crime scene in
the physical world, setting boundaries and selecting
what is relevant in such an abstract and intangible cyber
environment is in its infancy.12 This is not only a
technical problem, but also a significant socio-cultural
and collaborative problem that becomes even more
complex due to its trans-national nature.13 Digital
forensics is concerned with the investigation, analysis,
preservation and presentation of digital evidence as
part of the judicial process.14 However, because of the
complexity of technical architectures and the approach
to information systems security to promote business
continuity, and recovery to mitigate the effects of
unauthorized intrusion, the investigation process
becomes even more complex.15 The opportunities for
criminals to use digital means for their modus operandi
are legion, and the criminal imagination is offered
considerable possibilities when taking into account the
combination of availability, simplicity of use, mobility,
high performance, affordable technology, and the lack
of user awareness to protect their systems.
The characteristics of crime scene investigations have
evolved over the last few decades such that the skills
and attributes also need to be reconsidered. It is
suggested that those involved in digital forensic
investigations will need to have a holistic view and
knowledge of their domain from five perspectives:
technical (what is possible); professional (what is
permissible); practice (what is appropriate); ethical
(what is morally right) and legal. Technical expertise is
concerned with understanding digital information and
communication technologies. More precisely, the range
of knowledge should, for example, include any or all of
the following aspects: data storage, data
representation, data communication, computer
processes, operating systems, access controls, security,
the internet, protocols, client and server programming.
The plethora of technologies means there is a need for
suitable expertise which cannot be expected to be
found in a single investigator. This is reflected, for
example, in the ACPO guidelines16 and more specifically
with the second Principle, which provides that obtaining
access to the original data should only be performed by
a person competent in the specific underlying domain.
In summary these guidelines encompass the following:
ethics and its relation to the law and computing, legal
processes, digital evidence and includes a regulatory
framework for digital investigation. Although there are
series of guidelines17 and Standard Operating
Procedures18 that are widely available, these are not
sufficient if they are performed by a person that is not
competent in the respective subject. 
In practice, technical and professional strands can
merge, depending on the nature of the investigation,
and may be conducted in an individual suspect’s home,
a corporate site and across international boundaries.
Additionally where it is thought that incidents occurred
in a commercial environment, forensics investigators
will need to take into account business considerations
such as business continuity plans, disaster recovery
plans and information security plans. This is because
such considerations might provide the technical
evidence to support the investigation, and avoid
creating a disaster through the intervention of the
investigation. Successful investigations are possible
where appropriate collaborative communication has
been adopted in conjunction with some or all of the
following: the use of appropriate tools for the
investigation, compatible working practices when
handling evidence, and a forensic approach to the
detection, preservation, analysis and presentation of
10 Marjie T. Britz, Computer Forensics and Cyber
Crime, (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2004), p 5.
11 For three examples of many, see the United
Nations Manual on the Prevention and Control of
Computer-Related Crime, (UN, New York, 1994);
OECD, Recommendation of the Council concerning
Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems,
OECD/GD(92) 10, Paris, 1992, and in the European
Union, Council of Europe, Computer Related Crime,
Recommendation No. R(89)9 on Computer Related
Crime and Final Report of the European Committee
on Crime Problems, Strasbourg, 1990.
12 Alastair Irons and Anastasia Konstadopoulou,
‘Professionalism in digital forensics’, Digital
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 4
(2007) 45 – 50 and Stephen Mason, Electronic
Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery & Admissibility,
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007), Chapter 3.
13 Judie Mulholland, Message from the Guest Editor,
Special Issue: Phishing and Online Fraud Part II,
Journal of Digital Forensic Practice, Volume 1, Issue
3, 2006, pp 151-2.
14 Warren G. Kruse II and Jay G. Heiser, Computer
Forensics: Incident Response Essentials, (Addison
Wesley, 2001) and Eoghan Casey, Digital Evidence
and Computer Crime, (Academic Press, 2004).
15 Karen Scarfone and Peter Mell, Guide to Intrusion
Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS), (Special
Publication SP800-94, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, February 2007),
available on-line at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html.
16 Good Practice Guide for Computer based
Electronic Evidence (v4, 2007); see also Stephen
Mason, general editor, Electronic Evidence:
Disclosure, Discovery & Admissibility, (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2007), Appendix I for a longer
international list of guidance.
17 For example see the NIST Special Publication
Series, ‘Guidelines on Cell Phone Forensics’, 2007,
‘Guidelines on PDA Forensics’, 2004 and ‘Guide
to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident
Response’, 2006.
18 George Mohay, Alison Anderson, Byron Collie,
Olivier de Vel and Rodney D. McKemmish,
Computer and Intrusion Forensics, (Artech House,
2003), Chapter 3.
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evidence. What is appropriate in any one situation does
not only depend on the particular problem and
technology, but also on socio-cultural contexts and the
legal framework. These issues are clearly also
dependent on complex national and international
contexts, including the way legislation is interpreted,
applied and acted upon, which differs between States.
Historically, specifically formed groups and
organizations of experts and, occasionally, a task force
would often target international organized crime,
terrorist activities and other high profile crimes. This
may have been successful where there were relatively
small numbers of people that could be targeted with the
use of exceptional resources. The problem with
cybercrime is that it is something that is not limited to a
(relatively small number) of organized gangs or
international criminals or terrorist groups. The point is
that because of the success of ICT related technology,
more or less any existing crime can in one way or other
‘become’ transformed or extended into a cybercrime. In
addition, new activities occur that are difficult to classify
or are not catered for in existing legal frameworks.
It is possible to suggest that cybercrime is now the
‘everyday’ crime of the new era. It is no longer the
preserve of specialist groups of experts who should be
responsible for investigating cybercrime, but local
investigators in collaboration with local investigators in
a different country. This leads to the conclusion that
forensic investigators face a significantly more complex
task when investigating cybercrime and crimes involving
digital technology, in comparison with a traditional
crime scene. Thus the need for collaboration and
communication between different specialist individuals
and teams on a national and international level is often
unavoidable. Additional challenges arise because a
cybercrime scene tends to transcend national
boundaries and legal jurisdictions. With this in mind, an
overview of a possible framework to facilitate a complex
inquiry with the intent to encourage collaborative
working amongst members of investigatory teams and
between investigatory teams is discussed below.
A case for strategic systemic thinking 
Mulholland suggests that ‘…there are no quick fixes. To
solve the problem of online fraud or at least bring it
down to a manageable level requires a multi-facetted
approach by all the stakeholders involved’.19 The
framework for Strategic Systemic Thinking (SST)
described in this section, supports the involvement of
all those participating in an investigation. The SST
framework was developed to help organizations to
formulate appropriate processes to investigate
effectively, and to provide support for an inquiry. It was
developed specifically to help teams of users to analyze
complex problems. It is for this reason that the SST
framework is, arguably, suitable for use with cyber crime
scene investigations. Earlier work by two of the authors
with the cyber crimes in mind shows some promise.20
The SST framework involves three aspects, which are
not sequential and may be applied in any order. It is
intended to be repeatable, and it is possible to move
from one analysis to another repeatedly and in any
direction, at any time. A theory of the case can be
established, which can be adapted as more information
is obtained, analyzed and assessed.
The strategy adopted by an investigator will be
dependent upon the organizational culture, which
influences the amount of autonomy an investigator is
permitted. It is an essential characteristic of the SST
framework that the investigators control the
investigation. A team of investigators may comprise of
specialists, and one or more external facilitators
(experienced in systemic methods for inquiry) who
provide support and guidance. The framework supports
the investigation of complex problems. With the support
of the framework, each investigator can explore their
perspective on the theory of the case. The outside
individuals are present to act as the central coordinator
to discuss the various individual theories. The aim is to
bring thoughts about the case together to enable the
investigation to proceed, having taken into account
different opinions. Investigators can use a range of
methods, which are well known in the disciplines of
Information Systems (IS) and organizational studies, for
instance. In order to deal with complex and uncertain
problems, systems analysts have used methods and
techniques such as Brainstorming, Mind-Maps and
Effective Rich Pictures. These techniques have been
successfully used as part of IS methodologies such as
Soft Systems Methodology, SSM,21 Effective Technical
and Human Implementation of Computer Supported
Systems, ETHICS22 and Client-Led Design.23 These
methods have been used for years to assist people in
19 Judie Mulholland, Message from the Guest Editor,
Special Issue: Phishing and Online Fraud Part II,
Journal of Digital Forensic Practice, Volume 1, Issue
3, 2006, pp 151-2.
20 Vasilios Katos and Peter M. Bednar, ‘A cyber-crime
Investigation Framework’, Computer Standards &
Interfaces, Volume 30, Issue 4, (May 2008), pp
223-228.
21 Peter Checkland and Sue Holwell, Information,
Systems and Information Systems: making sense
of the field (Wiley, 1998).
22 Enid Mumford with Steve Hickey and Holly
Matthies, Designing Human Systems, (lulu.com,
2006).
23 Frank Stowell, and D. West, Client-led Design: a
systemic approach to information systems
definition (McGraw-Hill, 1994).
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Mind Mapping has been described as ‘a powerful
technique which provides a universal key to
unlocking the potential of the brain’.
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making sense of complex problems. The various
techniques and tools have different approaches to
analysis. McFazdean has defined brainstorming as
follows:24
‘Brainstorming relies on the absence of evaluations in
the ideas phase. Moreover, free-wheeling is
encouraged so that an extensive list of ideas can be
generated. The group members must be allowed to
communicate an idea, however mundane, strange or
wild, to the rest of the group. An idea that may seem
impractical may contain a germ of a great solution.’
A brainstorming session will produce an unstructured
collection of (lists of) ideas and concepts relating to a
problem.
Mind Mapping has a long history (it is thought that
Porphyry of Tyros from the third century CE used a form
of mind-mapping). More recently, however the semantic
network theory of human understanding (associated
with Allan M. Collins and M. Ross Quillan)25 included a
development of Mind Mapping as an explicit technique.
Mind Mapping has been described as ‘a powerful
technique which provides a universal key to unlocking
the potential of the brain’.26 Mind maps are recognizable
by their depiction of relationships between ideas and
concepts, often radiating from a central concept and
gathering details and associations along ‘branches’.
Analysts are able to identify and describe relationships
and associations in the form of a Mind Map. Rich
Pictures is a technique that is favoured by many
systems analysts, especially those using SSM.27 One of
the benefits of this technique is to enable the user to
take a more holistic view of a problem. Another benefit
is that it promotes the elaboration and exploration of
meanings between relations and associations of a
complex problem.28 Rich Pictures can be described as
‘pictorial, cartoon-like representations of the problem
situation that highlight the significant and contentious
aspects in a manner most likely to lead to original
thinking…’29 These techniques aim to bring about a
constructive dialogue between the investigators and
teams involved in the investigation.
Aspects of the SST framework
Intra-analysis is a phrase used to describe the ability of
investigators to have their own perspective on the
theory of the case. Inter-analysis is the part of the
inquiry where alternatives are discussed collectively.
The third aspect of the framework comprises the
evaluation. The evaluation represents an examination of
what is assumed to be known, that is, the results of
analysis.
One significant aspect of the SST framework is its
capability to incorporate a number of different
conclusions, which is particularly useful, because digital
forensics requires the investigator to consider that there
may be more than one conclusion to any given set of
facts. Forensic investigations are required to incorporate
the ability to deal with issues such as fuzziness of
inclusion, for example. That is, being able to identify
which digital data would be part of the digital evidence,
proving or refuting a user’s actions or intentions. In
dealing with complex cyber crime investigations, it is
conceivable that the investigators will explore
uncertainty in the following way:
a.unstructured uncertainty: the assumption of not
24 E. McFazdean, ‘Enhancing creative thinking within
organisations’, Management Decision, Volume 36,
Issue 5, (1998), p 312.
25 Allan M. Collins and M. Ross Quillan, ‘Retrieval
Time from Semantic Memory’, Journal of Verbal
Learning and Verbal Behavior, (1969), Volume 8,
240-247.
26 Tony Buzan, and Barry Buzan, The Mind Map
Book, (BBC, 2003), p 55.
27 Andrew Monk and Steve Howard, ‘Methods &
tools: the rich picture: a tool for reasoning about
work context’, Interactions, Volume 5, Issue 2,
(March/April 1998), pp 21-30.
28 Peter Bednar, and Lynn Day, ‘Systemic
combinatory use of Brainstorming, Mind-Maps and
Rich Pictures for analysis of complex problem
spaces’, Proceedings of ECRM 2009 Malta, 22-23
June: http://www.academic-
conferences.org/ecrm/ecrm2009/ecrm09-
home.htm.
29 Michael C. Jackson, Systems Thinking: Creative
Holism for Managers, (John Wiley and Sons, 2003),
pp 186-187.
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The more complex and uncertain any one problem becomes,
the more people tend to apply (‘scientific’) reductionist
techniques and models focusing on the rigour of analysis.
having enough information to commit to a decision;
b.structured uncertainty: the assumption of too much
information, conflicting information, ambiguities,
paradox (can be true and false at the same time).
Not only can an investigator never know for sure
whether what she or he investigates is the right thing to
investigate, but also the scope of investigation is
uncertain. This, among other reasons, is one reason why
it is not appropriate to use bi-valued logic, and in
practice it is not applied in investigations. While this
might appear to be obvious from an abstract generic
point of view, the problem becomes significant when
logically rational work processes and supporting IT
solutions are developed. The more complex and
uncertain any one problem becomes, the more people
tend to apply (‘scientific’) reductionist techniques and
models focusing on the rigour of analysis. This
behavioural pattern leads people to unwittingly
undermine their own human ability to deal with
uncertainty and paradoxes when dealing with complex
problems. So when processes and mechanisms are
developed to support such an investigation process,
they tend to omit obvious human activity and reasoning
that is contextually necessary. Ironically, if implemented
and used as intended, because of the nature of such
support systems, they would tend to undermine efforts
to focus on questions related to individual judgment
and understanding of the relevance of the problem.
Elements of the SST Framework have been designed to
accommodate four possible logical possibilities, and it
is argued that this framework is a good candidate for
addressing the requirements of digital forensics
investigations.
Conclusions
Cyber crime investigations can benefit from more
advanced methods of thinking about how to investigate
a complex cyber crime. An experienced forensic analyst
aims to place any investigation into context for the
purpose of transforming information from unstructured
to structured uncertainty. Any approach that is aimed at
supporting investigators to make decisions and to
communicate with each other must be able to
incorporate a number of different people with different
worldviews, languages and cultures. But this is not
enough; an approach must do more than support
interaction, it must also enable individuals to embrace
uncertainties in their everyday life as investigators. It is
suggested that the SST framework is a worth while
contender to be developed and applied for the purpose
of supporting complex cyber crime investigations.
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